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What is published in NATO Review does not constitute the official position or policy of NATO or member governments. NATO Review seeks to inform and promote debate on security issues. The views expressed by authors are their own.
In an article previously published on NATO Review, I explained that the nature of modern warfare is changing at a rapid pace. Consequently, wars are no longer merely about kinetic operations. This means that it is not just physical warfare, but also non-military strategies and tactics that define modern-day conflicts and wars.
What has also become commonplace is that kinetic operations - which by themselves have become increasingly complex - are combined with non-military strategies aimed at undermining the security of an antagonist. The combination of military and non-military instruments and strategies is done not randomly but in a synchronised way to achieve synergistic effects. In other words, it is this synchronised fusion that optimises the results.
The bottom line is that a particular country can potentially unleash physical force against an adversary to achieve certain goals. But if the use or threat of conventional or unconventional force is combined with and/or preceded by a degree of subversive tools such as cyber-attacks and disinformation, the overall damage inflicted on the antagonist can be optimised.
Despite state-driven hybrid warfare entailing a systematic integration of military, political, economic, civilian, and informational tools, it often plays out in grey zones below the threshold of a conventional war. In these grey zones, the military instrument is used unconventionally and innovatively to avoid attribution, responsibility, and sometimes even detection. So a hostile state can employ non-state actors or a non-attributable military force (like the “ little green men ”) in a clandestine war to deny involvement, but at the same time achieve strategic objectives.
An actor of hybrid warfare can employ non-state actors or a non-attributable military force - like the “ little green men ”, who have been linked to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline sabotage in 2022 - in a clandestine war to deny involvement but achieve strategic objectives. Pictured: a leak from the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, September 2022. © Swedish Coast Guard
In this article, we will take the discussion on hybrid warfare further by posing a question that has become not only relevant but also critical amid recent international conflicts: how is Russia fighting a hybrid war against the West? We try to understand its facets and implications, as well as the logic behind Russia’s strategy to undercut the security of Western powers.
One of the core facets of the common tools that states conflate to unleash hybrid warfare, such as non-state actors, political assassinations, espionage, cyber-attacks, electoral interference, and disinformation, is that there is ample room for plausible deniability – and there is often little evidence to establish culpability. Not all actions are disowned – sometimes aggressive posturing requires taking responsibility for one’s actions, but escaping culpability often offers strategic dividends. So when it was politically and strategically expedient to disown the "little green men” who invaded parts of Crimea in 2014, Russia did so (for a time).
The instruments or tools employed and fused together to unleash hybrid warfare are often difficult to discern, attribute, and corroborate. Proving that a certain non-state actor receives state patronage or linking cyber-attacks to a state is a daunting task. Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of hybrid attacks have been attributed to the Kremlin. Public evidence confirming Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential elections, and the admission by President Putin that Wagner was financed by Russia are two cases in point.
Hybrid warfare seems to have become an integral part of Moscow’s policy vis-à-vis the West. With the rising relevance and efficacy of non-state actors as well as the advent of new technologies like autonomous weapons, hybrid warfare below the traditional threshold of war has become possible. States sometimes do not even have to create or cultivate non-state actors because transactional relationships with existing groups can do the job. For instance, at one point, intelligence reports suggested that the Russian military covertly offered bounties to Taliban-linked militants for targeting coalition forces in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, new technologies allow states to use force from a distance and deny involvement. Drone strikes and attacks on critical infrastructure are good examples of this.
A Russian rocket strike hits a critical power facility in Kharkiv, Ukraine, prompting blackouts across the region, 11 September 2022. © Reuters / Cover Images
Russia’s hybrid warfare has been in full swing in recent years, but it did not evolve overnight. Top Russian officials started calling for a comprehensive security doctrine around a decade ago. Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov suggested in 2013 that the country’s security policy needed to adapt to the changing nature of conflicts. In an article that has been widely scrutinised in Western policy circles, Gerasimov highlighted the growing role of non-military means for achieving political and strategic objectives.
Gerasimov referred to not only automated, robotic, and artificial intelligence tools in armed conflict, but also to the use of asymmetric actions and information spheres in offsetting an enemy’s advantage. Such asymmetric actions range from guerilla warfare to terrorist attacks, and from the creation and stoking up of mis-/disinformation to direct state propaganda coupled with proactive diplomacy. When an antagonist enjoys superiority in terms of its capabilities, a state can employ a combination of these tools to undercut an adversary’s advantage. The late head of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, General Makhmut Gareev, had argued that one of the lessons that Russia could draw from the 2014 invasion of Crimea was to perfect the use of soft power, politics and information to achieve strategic goals.
Both Russian officials were essentially highlighting the need to develop a strategy that could truncate the power asymmetry between the Western powers and Russia. They understood that Russia did not, by any means, have the military capability or economic resources to be on par with the Western powers, but the extensive integration of non-military means with kinetic power could reduce, if not nullify, this power differential.
Russia’s military doctrines of 2010 and 2014 also referred to the integrated use of military and non-military resources and means. These did not explicitly mention hybrid warfare as a model, but a critical look at Russia’s security policy reveals that the non-military means have not only been employed extensively in recent years but have also been used to complement hard power. There are several examples that illustrate this combination, including fanning disinformation, sponsoring non-state actors in Russia’s European neighbourhood and beyond, launching cyberattacks, interfering in the electoral processes of Western countries, and using energy as a weapon.
The employment of such tools diminishes the power asymmetry between two states in a number of ways. The target’s decision-making process may be damaged because a non-attributable force has conducted the hostile action, or there is plausible deniability on the part of the aggressor. Polarisation may be deepened on state and societal levels due to disinformation. Certain actors and narratives that align with the aggressor’s objectives are supported and expanded. The lack of military means to offset the target’s hard power superiority is partly offset by other kinds of leverage like energy (and even food supply). These are just a few examples.
As alluded to earlier, military involvement can also be indirect, with armed non-state actors playing a crucial role in modern conflicts. For instance, in order to scuttle Moldova’s bid to join the European Union (EU), Moscow combines military presence in the eastern part of the country with non-military hybrid strategies. These non-military strategies include patronising anti-EU groups, leveraging energy supplies to the detriment of the Moldovan people, and fanning disinformation through local groups as well as on social media. It goes without saying that Moldova is a target because it desires full integration in the European bloc. In Moldova, Russia’s hybrid warfare has been aimed at toppling the country’s pro-EU government.
In Moldova, Russia’s hybrid warfare has targeted the country’s pro-EU government. Pictured: protests against the Western-oriented government of Moldova, September 2022. © CNN
Meanwhile, the goal in Syria has been to consolidate the control of the pro-Russia regime of President Bashar al Assad. The direct military involvement of Russian forces has been more widespread in Syria because the situation permits this. Military operations have been fused with support for armed militants, propaganda and disinformation, diplomacy and economic statecraft, and political influence. The overarching goal in Syria has been to not only expand Russian influence in the Middle East but to capitalise on this to hurt relations between Middle Eastern and Western countries.
The case of Syria clearly shows that Russia’s hybrid war against the West goes far beyond the geographical boundaries of European or Western countries. Another example of this is Russian hybrid warfare in Africa, designed to undermine Western influence on the resource-rich continent. In the Sahel, Russia capitalised on deteriorating relations with Western powers and perpetrated anti-Western sentiments by expanding its footprint . In countries like Mali and Central African Republic, Russia has been providing security assistance, diplomatic support, and help with information operations. One target is building global influence; another is undercutting Western interests. Both go hand-in-hand for Moscow.
It is often difficult to fully diagnose an active or recent hybrid threat. For instance, when France’s TV5Monde came under a fierce cyber attack in 2015, the Islamic State militant group was initially deemed responsible. It later transpired that the attack was perpetrated by a Russian hacker group, which posted jihadist messages on the network’s website and social media pages to sow discord and confusion.
Returning to the issue of Russia’s interference in the 2016 US elections, the implications were far-reaching. One of the defining outcomes was a contribution to the mainstreaming of right-wing populism in the US, which the country is still dealing with. Right-wing populism can create a crisis of legitimacy for state institutions whereby trust in those who govern becomes eroded. In recent years, right-wing populism has been pitting people against state institutions, political and economic leaders, the mainstream media, as well as certain minority groups such as migrants. As right-wing populism contributes towards and intersects with declining trust in mainstream media, disinformation can be employed to create security woes within target states. Russia strategically uses disinformation to achieve political and strategic goals.
It is worth mentioning that digital and social media are breeding grounds for disinformation, and Russia brings that into its strategic calculus. EUvsDisinfo maintains a database of tens of thousands of online disinformation samples purportedly linked to the Kremlin. In 2021, a Facebook report revealed that Russia was the top source of "coordinated inauthentic behavior" internationally. The online disinformation campaign to derail the 2023 NATO Summit is a pertinent example of how Russia targets an actor it sees as its nemesis. Since NATO is paramount to Western security, it is a recurring target of Russian online disinformation, as EUvsDinfo documents . Such disinformation is based on not only fabrication, but also distortion, like the campaign that spun NATO’s preparedness in Eastern Europe post-2014 as aggression, even though it was a corollary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Crimea. The narrative is methodically twisted to invert the cause and effect.
Russian online disinformation banks on state-sponsored sources and pro-Moscow groups acting in tandem to amplify false and misleading narratives, which are spread in multiple languages to play out globally. Disinformation peddled by Russia is sometimes very effective. Serbia, for instance, has strong political and economic ties with Western Europe, but most Serbians view Russia as the country’s closest partner and its “greatest friend”. A key reason is the narratives promoted by Russian news outlets like RT and Sputnik, which dominate the Serbian traditional and digital media landscape. Such narratives demean Western Europe and the US, while eulogising Russia and China. Russia-sponsored disinformation has paid similar dividends in the non-Western world as well. Disinformation geared towards driving a wedge between Africa and the West contributes towards a lack of consensus over and support for Ukraine on the continent.
Moscow sees itself fighting a long war against what it deems a Western hegemony. It is in this context that Russian President Putin terms “Western elite” the enemy. What exactly he means by Western elite is kept ambiguous, perhaps for political expediency, but his ultimate nemeses are clearly the US and European powers who lead the global political and economic order.
Moscow’s hostility towards the West is just the tip of the iceberg. In terms of a grand strategy, Moscow, under President Putin’s leadership, desires a return to the power balance of the past wherein the Soviet Union was a superpower and could thus define the rules of the international order on a global level. But Moscow realises that it structurally cannot find much space in the international political order, which places a premium on values like freedom and democracy – ideals that are extremely limited in Russia. So the international order ought to be redefined in a bid to (re-)establish Russia’s ascendency over global politics and economy. This is apparent within the Primakov Doctrine – so-called for former Foreign and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. The Doctrine posits that Russia should aim to establish a multipolar world so that the global order cannot be defined by a single power or pole. It is for this reason that Moscow aims to undercut what it views as Western power and Western influence around the world.
The biggest obstacle for Russia is that it has neither the hard power nor economic influence to be able to achieve this grand goal. Perhaps the Kremlin believes that its hybrid warfare toolkit can help it find a way around this issue. The idea is two-fold: enhancing Russia’s power capabilities through an integration of military and non-military means, and exploiting and exacerbating the internal vulnerability of Western powers. The goal is clear: truncate power asymmetry between Russia and Western powers in order to triumph over them.
An armoured convoy of pro-Russian troops in the southern port city of Mariupol, Ukraine, on 21 April 2022. © Chingis Kondarov / Reuters
Despite Russia fighting an aggressive hybrid war in recent years, defeating Western powers seems to be a far cry for now. This is because hybrid warfare can reduce but not completely offset the power asymmetry between the Western powers and Moscow, given Russia’s limited military and economic capabilities. Western powers have also worked to enhance their resilience after the invasion of Ukraine, while Russia looks internally unstable. Does this mean that Russia’s hybrid war against the West has failed so far? Perhaps not entirely. It has managed to achieve some of its primary objectives, particularly in terms of undermining Western strategic influence and political power on a global scale. The expanding Russian footprint in the Middle East and Africa at the cost of declining Western influence is an example of this. Russia’s hybrid warfare has also contributed to deepening political polarisation within and between Western countries. This is worrisome.
What Western powers must do now is pursue concerted efforts to surmount all components of Russia’s hybrid war in a meticulous manner. This is not solely warranted by the ways in which Russia puts Western security in jeopardy, but also serves as preparation for the potential future exploitation of vulnerabilities by China.
With modern warfare changing in terms of its core facets, conflicts are much more than the employment of direct, physical force. They are increasingly marked by sophisticated hybridity. For Russia, this means a lot in relation to its strategic calculus and compulsions. Like virtually all countries in the world, Moscow understands that it ought to upgrade, expand, and diversify its toolkit to include non-kinetic tools – in its case, that includes tools like economic statecraft and disinformation – to complement military instruments and tools, which themselves are used more innovatively.
Considering Moscow’s aggressive ambitions, hybrid warfare is not only attractive but also a strategic compulsion for Russia owing to its conspicuous power asymmetry vis-à-vis the West. Russia’s military budget and technology, as well as the size and diversity of its economy, are not even comparable to the wide-ranging capabilities of the Western powers. Hybrid warfare allows Moscow to reduce—if not offset—this power imbalance to confront what it considers its enemy rivals.
The key tools that Russia has employed in pursuit of its hybrid warfare against Western countries include the politicisation/weaponisation of energy, the employment of non-state actors and non-attributable forces, support for pro-Russia and Russia-leaning actors, an extensive use of disinformation, and election-meddling. These are synchronised in a systematic way.
The extent to which Russia’s hybrid warfare enables it to achieve its grand objectives against the West remains to be seen. So far, Russia has undermined Western security to some extent, but it has certainly not stopped Western powers from shaping politics, economy, and culture in a democratic way on the global level. Nevertheless, considering Russia’s limited military and economic capabilities, its hybrid tactics have allowed it to act “bigger” than it is. Western states must recognise this and consider a thought-out plan to decisively respond to Russia’s strategies in a unified way.
Tony Barber
Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
Every week brings grim and dramatic news from the war in Ukraine: Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian convoys; Vladimir Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons; captured towns liberated by Ukrainian forces; young Russian men fleeing the draft. Yet it is no accident that Europe’s most destructive conflict since the second world war is taking place on Ukrainian soil. After the cold war, most of central and eastern Europe, including the three Baltic states that had broken free from the Soviet Union, were brought into Nato and the EU. But Ukraine remained a place of uncertain allegiance, neither in western alliance structures, nor aligned with Moscow, nor officially neutral.
In Russia, a truculent, grievance-filled nationalism under Putin and an authoritarian style of rule contrasted with a lively, if imperfect democracy in Ukraine and a society learning to be proud of its national culture and statehood. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Donbas in 2014, Ukraine’s leaders came with increasing determination to see their country’s future in the western family of nations. For its part, the Kremlin and its ultranationalist supporters viewed such aspirations as a US-inspired plot to degrade Russia’s identity, interests and prestige, bringing closer a showdown between Russian and western civilisation.
At once something more than a Russian-Ukrainian war, and something less than a full-scale military clash between Moscow and the west, the conflict is in its eighth month and shows no sign of ending soon. The Kremlin’s partial mobilisation of Russian civilians and attempted annexation by sham referendums of four Ukrainian provinces indicate that Putin is digging in for a prolonged fight. Ukraine is buoyed by recent battlefield advances and the promise of sustained western military and economic support to continue its struggle. For their part, western governments are preparing for a hard winter of war-induced recession and energy crises that may sour the public mood, but they believe too much is at stake to permit a settlement rewarding Putin’s aggression.
Two new books, written by authors with first-hand experience of conditions in Ukraine, do a fine job of placing the war in its larger historical, geopolitical and social contexts. Each has a particular focus. Anna Arutunyan, a Russian-American specialist on postcommunist Russia and Ukraine, concentrates in Hybrid Warriors on why fighting erupted in Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014, paving the way to Putin’s gamble last February on all-out war. Samir Puri, a war studies lecturer and former UK diplomat, pays close attention in Russia’s Road to War with Ukraine to the larger international setting of Ukrainian-Russian hostilities, above all how they reflected and were sharpened by tensions between Nato and Moscow .
In her illuminating, well-researched book, Arutunyan sets out a nuanced argument about the Donbas conflict that will not satisfy some Ukrainians but is convincing nonetheless. She contends that it oversimplifies matters to portray the Kremlin as the exclusive instigator of the separatist insurgency of 2014. “In a general sense, this is largely accurate. However, it misses . . . the extent to which local [pro-Moscow] separatists and the Russian non-state fighters and activists who initially came to fight alongside them shaped the insurgency and the war it sparked.”
Because the Kremlin really did orchestrate the annexation of Crimea, some western policymakers and analysts assumed the same must be true of the Donbas conflict. However, the fighting was “as much fuelled by local divisions as by Moscow’s meddling”, Arutunyan writes. For sure, widespread violence would not have erupted without Russia’s involvement. But social divisions in Donbas dating to Ukraine’s independence in 1991 were real, and some local Russians, alienated from the authorities who took power in Kyiv after the Maidan revolution of early 2014, were willing to fight.
When the Soviet Union disappeared, I didn’t really accept the Ukrainian regime A fighter tells Anna Arutunyan
One reason lay in the modern history of Donbas, shaped by Russian immigration, the dominance of heavy industry in the regional economy and Sovietisation, Arutunyan says. With a largely Russian factory and mining workforce and a heroic image forged in the fires of Joseph Stalin’s crash industrialisation, Donbas “became the cradle of a quintessential Soviet identity”. Interviewed in May 2014, many pro-Moscow residents told her they did not want incorporation into Russia but hankered for “some version of the Soviet Union”.
Arutunyan describes those who took up arms as “idealists, enthusiasts, mercenaries, drifters, men and women with criminal pasts — who were not acting under orders from Moscow but . . . who felt . . . forgotten, maligned and misunderstood — pushed out to the margins of history”. A fighter tells her: “When the Soviet Union disappeared from the face of the earth, I didn’t really accept the Ukrainian regime”.
“On some level, I just wanted to run around with a Kalashnikov,” another fighter said.
Also involved were non-state fighters from Russia, a development that, as Arutunyan observes perceptively, recalls how volunteers fought for the tsarist empire against Ottoman Turkey in the 1870s. They represented “the private and the rightwing sector of [Russian] civil society . . . businessmen, think tanks and independent political activists coalesced around an imperialist agenda”.
By August 2014, Russia was sending regular soldiers to eastern Ukraine, but for seven years and more Putin held back from recognising the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk statelets. He also dropped the so-called Novorossiya project , an ultranationalist vision of Russian-controlled territory stretching from Kharkiv to Odesa.
Then everything changed in February. Why? Arutunyan mentions Putin’s sense of national victimhood, intensified perhaps by his immersion during the Covid-19 lockdowns in the works of mystical Russian pseudo-historians such as Lev Gumilev . Briefings about US plots from the FSB intelligence agency may have influenced him. Whatever his motives, Arutunyan doubts the war will end well for Putin but tries to sound optimistic about Russia. “This war may represent the last, violent throes of a dying empire that will leave something new in its wake . . . a new Russia, with its own, new national identity.”
In his stimulating and thoughtful book, Puri describes Putin as “enraptured by an apocalyptic nostalgia for the Soviet and the tsarist incarnations of Russian empire”. He shares Arutunyan’s view that Putin’s isolation during the pandemic seems to have hardened his animosity towards Ukraine, mentioning a 2021 essay, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” , that was “a bright red flag warning that something wicked was coming Ukraine’s way”.
Puri, author of The Great Imperial Hangover (2020), a well-received book on how the legacies of empires shape the modern world, comments that for 500 years Russia has had little experience of not being an empire. Unlike countries with possessions overseas, the Russian state and empire grew together in the vast spaces adjoining the Russian heartland.
Puri, like Arutunyan, asks whether Ukraine can be free, sovereign and unmenaced by Russia over the long term
Coupled with Russian population movements into Donbas and other areas, this surely made it easier for Putin to think of postcommunist Ukraine as an “errant province”, not a sovereign state. Puri quotes Vladislav Surkov , once a senior Kremlin adviser on Ukraine, as saying in 2020: “Forceful coercion for brotherly relations, this is the only method that has historically proven effective when it comes to Ukraine.”
Puri is no apologist for Putin’s Russia. Yet his book will stir some controversy with its contention that the US and its allies badly mishandled relations with Moscow by offering Ukraine unrealistic hopes of Nato membership. “Tens of thousands of people have perished along the way of proving the point that Nato’s open door should always remain open, no matter the neighbourhood. Nato has, of course, no blood on its hands here, but as an exercise in effective statecraft, Nato’s past record of handling Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership aspirations is a shoddy one.”
Puri also faults European policymakers for forging ties with former Soviet republics at Russia’s expense, while failing to address the reality that Moscow retained the power to disagree forcefully that it should be kept out of Europe’s future. There is something to this, but arguably it understates the way that Putin’s aggressive foreign policy went hand in hand with the increasingly repressive regime he was building at home — a trend over which the west had little influence.
What of Ukraine’s future? Puri thinks partition, though not desirable, is possible. He mentions Cyprus, divided since 1974, and Germany in the cold war as bleak examples. More broadly, he asks, like Arutunyan, whether Ukraine can be free, sovereign and unmenaced by Russia over the long term. Although he offers no definite answer, readers may well conclude from his hard-headed survey that the best guarantee for Ukraine would be a free, democratic Russia rid of imperial impulses. How to get there is an altogether different matter.
Hybrid Warriors : Proxies, Freelancers and Moscow’s Struggle for Ukraine by Anna Arutunyan, Hurst £20, 352 pages
Russia’s Road to War with Ukraine : Invasion Amidst the Ashes of Empires by Samir Puri, Biteback Publishing £20, 304 pages
Tony Barber is the FT’s European comment editor
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In summary, hybrid yachts use a combination of electric battery and engine power for their propulsion systems, allowing for a more environmentally friendly cruising experience. These yachts employ advanced hybrid technologies and are more fuel-efficient than traditional yachts.
February 20, 2024. The Sirena 48 hybrid model has twin 213-killowatt electric motors. Top speed: 14 knots. Courtesy Sirena Yachts. Sirena Yachts in Turkey has unveiled a hybrid version of its entry-level motoryacht, the Sirena 48. The Sirena 48 made its debut at the 2023 Cannes Yachting Festival. Now, the builder is adding an option for buyers ...
BYD Group presents the 50m hybrid motor yacht project in cooperation with Atollvic Shipard.The BYD 50 is the latest generation yacht, with a full hybrid propulsion system with azimuthal thrusters.…. by René. AMARE II // Heesen Yachts. AMARE II (ex Project ELECTRA) is the second hybrid yacht by Heesen Yachts.
Azimut Yachts in Italy has introduced the Seadeck series of hybrid motoryachts. The first model is the 56-foot Seadeck 6, which is scheduled to debut at the Düsseldorf boat show in January 2024. The larger Seadeck 7 and Seadeck 8 models are expected to follow between 2024 and 2025. The Seadeck 7 has a 72-foot length overall, with details about ...
There are two elements to this. First, a diesel engine is not an efficient converter of chemical energy into thrust, creating a lot of heat and noise in the process. Second, the torque ...
As the world's first fast hybrid yacht with a fast displacement hull form, Home is a pioneering new vessel that offers perhaps some of life's greatest luxuries: peace and quiet. She is made of lightweight aluminum and can use diesel or electric propulsion (read: using less fuel), enabling silent cruising at a speed of up to nine knots.
The Swedish propulsion giant explores a silent, sustainable future with its hybrid-electric system. Volvo Penta recently hosted a soft launch of its hybrid-electric propulsion system with select member of the press and their dealers to gauge feedback before moving into production. The system, being developed in conjunction with Groupe Beneteau ...
Powered by hybrid propulsion utilizing both diesel and electric power, they combine the best of two worlds. Hybrid yachts not only reduce emissions, but improve range, performance, and comfort on board. Capable of operating in a range of cruising modes, hybrid yachts combine the benefits of diesel engines and electric motors.
Hybrid yachts, much like hybrid cars, are yachts that employ the use of both conventional and electric engines. More specifically, the drivetrain in a hybrid yacht relies on two or more power sources for both propulsion (moving the yacht forward) and onboard needs like air conditioning. In most cases, the two power sources are a diesel or gas ...
Arguably one of the first private yachts to be built using hybrid technology was S/Y Ethereal.Launched in 2008 by Bill and Shannon Joy the 58m Royal Huisman Ethereal featured a custom-built hybrid propulsion system and was designed to be as energy efficient as possible. With 500kW/h power storage capacity and the option of power recovery by using its propellers to generate electric power under ...
Advantages of our Hybrid Propulsion for Yachts. Significant savings on fuel consumption. Drastically reduce main engine and variable speed generators running hours. Savings on scheduled maintenance. Our hybrid yacht propulsion system is maintenance free. Only the dedicated water cooling pumps require service. Higher resale value of your vessel.
Thanks for watching! "Despite appearances, Norse is a hybrid electric motoryacht that uses the wind as a secondary source of power," Stacey says. "Sail-assist is a readily available technology that, in the right conditions, can save on fuel consumption at least 20 percent.". Norse is a 262-foot sail-assisted explorer concept by Oliver ...
As of January 2024, the best interest rates for yacht loans typically start around 7.74%. These rates fluctuate with market conditions, inflation, and supply and demand. Borrowers with the highest credit scores and strongest overall financial profiles usually get the best yacht loan rates. The higher your credit score, the lower your interest ...
Hybrid solutions are among the keystones of a sustainable future. The power of a diesel engine, which allows top speeds, is combined with the sustainable, emission-and vibration-free comfort of an electric drive. The highlight, in addition to fuel and cost savings, is that with a hybrid system, yacht owners can explore waters previously off ...
Our engineers rebuilt a dive boat to create the Hybrid, an eco-showpiece powered by solar panels, wind turbines and fuel-efficient diesel engines. Five buffet and cocktail setups offer prime viewing and mingling opportunities, and the 64-foot, 120-person vessel also serves as a floating environmental classroom for educational cruises. Carpet, countertops and fixtures incorporate recycled and ...
Hybridsysteme für Yachten. Unsere einzigartigen Hybrid-Antriebslösungen bieten ein Maximum an Power und Agilität bei deutlich weniger Emissionen, Vibrationen und Lärm. So wird aus Ihrer Freizeit echte Freiheit. Fahrspaß pur und ein Bordleben der Extraklasse mit dem mtu Hybrid-PropulsionPack. Unsere Hybridantriebe verringern Emissionen ...
Hybrid warfare seems to have become an integral part of Moscow's policy vis-à-vis the West. With the rising relevance and efficacy of non-state actors as well as the advent of new technologies like autonomous weapons, hybrid warfare below the traditional threshold of war has become possible. States sometimes do not even have to create or ...
Hybrid Warriors: Proxies, Freelancers and Moscow's Struggle for Ukraine by Anna Arutunyan, Hurst £20, 352 pages. Russia's Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion Amidst the Ashes of Empires by ...
NATO has issued a sharp warning over "hostile" Russian activity across Europe. In a statement released on Thursday, the 32-member military alliance said it was "deeply concerned about recent ...
Strategy Review: Hybrid Warriors: Proxies, Freelancers and Moscow's Struggle for Ukraine Author(s): Anna Arutunyan Reviewed by Dr. Sarah Lohmann, teaching faculty, University of Washington Dr. Sarah Lohmann, editor of What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare (US Army War College Press, 2022), calls Anna Arutunyan's latest book, Hybrid Warriors, a "must-read for senior members of the US ...